In the Wisconsin Supreme Court

RICHARD TEIGEN AND RICHARD THOM, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS-PETITIONERS,

υ.

WISCONSIN ELECTION COMMISSION,
DEFENDANT-CO-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT

DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, INTERVENOR-DEFENDANT-CO-APPELLANT-RESPONDENT,

DISABILITY RIGHTS WISCONSIN, WISCONSIN FAITH VOICES FOR JUSTICE, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF WISCONSIN, INTERVENORS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS-RESPONDENTS

On Appeal from the Decision of the Circuit Court of Waukesha County, Honorable Michael Bohren Presiding Circuit Court Case No. 21-cv-958

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR BYPASS

WISCONSIN INSTITUTE FOR LAW & LIBERTY

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH WIS. STAT. §§ 809.19(12)

I hereby certify that I have submitted an electronic copy of this appendix, which is identical in content and format to the printed form of the appendix filed as of this date.

Dated: January 26, 2022.

LUKE N. BERG

In by

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS

FILED 01-24-2022 **CLERK OF WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS**

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January 24, 2022

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You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following order:

2022AP91 Richard Teigen v. Wisconsin Election Commission (L.C. # 2021CV958)

Before Blanchard, P.J., Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

The Wisconsin Election Commission and the intervenors (collectively, the movants) move for relief pending appeal in the form of an order staying the circuit court's order that the Commission withdraw, by Monday, January 24, 2022, certain guidance that it issued in 2020 to election administrators statewide. That guidance relates to drop-boxes for the collection of

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absentee ballots, whether electors are required to personally mail or deliver their absentee ballots, and other matters. We now grant the motions and stay, through February 15, 2022, the circuit court's order.

The timeline for these motions for relief has been unusually compressed due to the timing and substance of the circuit court order in relation to Wisconsin's spring primary, which will be completed on February 15, 2022.

Just eleven days ago, on January 13, 2022, the circuit court held a motion hearing and issued an oral decision declaring the Commission's guidance invalid. The court also ordered that no later than January 27, 2022, the Commission must withdraw its guidance and issue a statement notifying clerks that the Commission's interpretation of applicable statutes has been declared invalid. Based on the filings in this court, we understand that the intervenors immediately sought a stay in the circuit court on the grounds that the February 2022 spring primary was already underway and that changing instructions about the lawful means of returning absentee ballots in the midst of an election would cause confusion for local clerks and electors alike. The circuit court scheduled the stay hearing for the afternoon of Friday, January 21. During the hearing, the court denied the requested stay. Additionally, upon learning that the statutory deadline for municipal clerks to deliver absentee ballots to voters is Tuesday, January 25, the circuit court amended its order, moving up the Commission's deadline to withdraw its guidance to the following business day, Monday, January 24.

¹ According to the Commission, county clerks are required by statute to deliver ballots to municipal clerks by Monday, January 24, 2022, *see* WIS. STAT. § 7.10(3)(a), and municipal clerks are (continued)

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The Commission and the intervenors filed their motions seeking emergency relief in this court. In their motions, they represented that the Commission's first opportunity to meet to address compliance with the circuit court's order would be Monday, January 24, at 4:00 p.m. Due to the immediacy of the circuit court deadlines and the urgency of the matter, we ordered a briefing schedule over the weekend. The respondents have now submitted materials in response, and the Commission and the intervenors have submitted materials in reply. In these new materials, the Commission represents that as of 7:57 this morning, 8,398 ballots have already been sent to voters by municipal clerks, and that United States Post Office records confirm that at least 1,845 ballots have already been delivered or are currently out for delivery.

In considering a motion for relief pending appeal, this court reviews whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in deciding the motion. *State v. Gudenschwager*, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 439-40, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995). We affirm if the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. *Id.* at 440. The movants must (1) make a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal, (2) show that they will suffer irreparable injury unless a stay is granted, (3) show that no substantial harm will come to other interested parties, and (4) show that a stay will do no harm to the public interest. *Id.*

Ordinarily, in considering whether a circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in considering relief pending appeal, we would have the benefit of a written decision or a transcript of an oral decision that explains the court's reasoning. Here, because of the compressed timeline, we

required to deliver absentee ballots to electors who have previously requested them by Tuesday, January 25, 2022, see Wis. STAT. § 7.15(1)(cm).

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have not been provided with a transcript. The movants provide a brief description of the court's ruling. The respondents assert that the description is incorrect, but they do not identify specific inaccuracies or provide any alternate description of the ruling. However, the parties clearly agree that the circuit court fully denied relief. In light of the short time period that has resulted from the circuit court's Friday order directing action by Monday, we decline to allow the absence of a transcript to stymie a review of the decision to deny relief pending appeal.

We first address the likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal. The respondents address the merits and they correctly point out that the motions for a stay do not include developed arguments on the likelihood of success. However, both movants filed reply briefs today and have now provided their arguments, which are consistent with the arguments reflected in the transcripts they previously provided of the circuit court's January 13, 2022 hearing. From all of these sources we are now familiar with the legal arguments that the parties will make in this appeal. We also note that the decision was made on summary judgment, so this appeal will not include review of whether any factual findings were clearly erroneous.

Having reviewed the arguments of the parties, we conclude that they show that the movants have "more than the mere 'possibility' of success on the merits," which is the minimum showing necessary to support a grant of relief pending appeal. *See Gudenschwager*, 191 Wis. 2d at 441. Because briefing on the merits has yet to occur in this appeal, we decline to discuss specific issues or our analysis more generally at this time, so as not to affect the briefing. Of necessity, our analysis is preliminary and has been conducted in a compressed time period.

We conclude that the other factors weigh heavily in favor of relief pending appeal. To summarize those arguments, the movants argue that the change in guidance ordered by the

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circuit court, during the early stages of an election already in progress, will cause confusion among voters and create problems for state and local election administrators, as we discuss below.

As an initial point, the respondents contend that the circuit court's order does not effectuate a change, because the court did not change the law, but ordered only that the Commission withdraw guidance that did not comply with the law. This argument is not consistent with the respondents' own argument that the Commission guidance *does* have the force of law, and therefore was a rule that was not properly promulgated under WIS. STAT. ch. 227.

However, putting aside the question of whether the guidance does or does not have the force of law, there is no dispute that guidance by the Commission, in general, has the practical effect of guiding decisions made by election administrators statewide. That is its purpose. It is reasonable to infer that a change in guidance will cause a change in practice by those administrators. Causing that change is presumably why the respondents brought this suit in the first place. Having now prevailed, it is absurd for them to claim that no change has occurred.

Turning specifically to the second factor, whether the movants will suffer irreparable injury, the injuries that they describe are related to voter confusion and election administration, and can reasonably be regarded as injuries to the election system as a whole.² As the statewide agency charged with administering elections, we regard the Commission as standing in a position

² Although this order focuses on issues of voter confusion and election administration, we acknowledge that the intervenors are also claiming a more direct injury to the voting rights of disabled (continued)

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that enables it to seek protection from injury to those interests. *See* WIS. STAT. § 5.05. In other words, injuries to voters and to orderly election administration in general can properly be characterized as injuries that the Commission can defend against.

There are two forms of injury that concern us in particular. One is caused by the fact that the withdrawal of guidance that the circuit court has ordered to occur by today would come during an election process that is already underway. As stated above, the statutory deadline for county clerks to deliver ballots to municipal clerks is today, and tomorrow is the deadline for municipal clerks to deliver absentee ballots to electors (including military and overseas electors) who previously requested them.

The movants have provided evidence that some absentee ballots have already been mailed to electors with instructions that are consistent with the Commission guidance as it exists now, and as it existed when those materials were created and distributed, but will no longer be supported by guidance if the guidance is withdrawn. Specifically, an affidavit filed today from Megan Wolfe, administrator of the Commission, confirms that as of 7:57 this morning, clerks had reported that 8,398 ballots had been sent out to electors, and United States Post Office records confirm that at least 1,845 ballots have been delivered (or are out for delivery now).

The potential for voter confusion and uncertainty in administration is apparent in this situation. As the Commission notes, there may be voters who have already deposited their absentee ballots in drop boxes or given their ballots to a spouse, caregiver, or other person to

voters specifically. However, time constraints prevent us from fully developing a discussion of that argument.

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mail or to otherwise return to the clerk. If the current guidance is withdrawn at this stage of the election process, there is significant uncertainty as to whether these votes would be counted. Given this situation, the risk of confusion—and possible disenfranchisement—is compelling.

The second form of injury is created by the timeline itself, particularly given the circuit court's decision late in the afternoon on Friday, January 21, to move up to today, Monday, January 24, the date by which the guidance must be withdrawn. The Commission states that in order to take the steps necessary to comply with the circuit court's order, it must convene a meeting that complies with Wisconsin's open meetings laws, including notice requirements. The Commission states that, as a result, the soonest it could hold such a meeting is 4:00 p.m. today. Once that meeting is held, all of the following must then occur by tomorrow in order to comply with the statutory deadline by which absentee ballots must be mailed to electors: (1) the Commission must, at a minimum, notify Wisconsin's municipal clerks that it has withdrawn the current guidance; (2) the Commission must determine whether, in light of this guidance withdrawal, it should provide municipal clerks with additional guidance, and if so, what that guidance should be;³ and (3) upon receipt of this information, municipal clerks who have not already mailed out absentee ballots must make the necessary changes to the absentee ballot instructions and then mail the absentee ballots to electors. Based on the information available,

³ For example, as the intervenors note, there is the question of what, if any, guidance the Commission should give to municipal clerks regarding their responsibilities for enforcing the directive that the electors themselves must personally mail or deliver their absentee ballots.

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we can only conclude that it is implausible that, given this timeframe, the changes can be made without creating a high risk of inconsistent or incomplete guidance to voters.⁴

The respondents minimize the potential for such confusion or administrative difficulties.

They assert: "Nor is there any serious challenge for clerks or risk of confusion in the upcoming election." This assertion is simply not realistic.

On the third and fourth factors, whether a stay will cause harm to other interested parties or the public interest, we note that the respondents do not claim that there has been any showing in this litigation that holding elections in the manner provided in the disputed Commission guidance has any specific adverse effect on voters, election administration, or any other interest. Instead, they rely on the importance of adherence to election law in general: "Plaintiffs, like all Wisconsin voters, have an interest in elections being held in accordance with state law, so that they and all other voters will have the benefit of the safeguards and procedural evenhandedness that the Legislature long ago determined were appropriate."

We naturally agree on the importance of adhering to Wisconsin election laws. However, the respondents' reliance on that general proposition becomes circular when applied in the context of relief pending appeal, because it assumes that the respondents and the circuit court are

⁴ As the Commission notes, the United States Supreme Court in *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006), and our supreme court in *Hawkins v. Wisconsin Elections Comm'n*, 2020 WI 75, ¶¶2-5, 393 Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877, have expressed a shared set of significant concerns in addressing the risks that may attend court directives that address election procedures being issued during or shortly before the election process. *See Hawkins*, 393 Wis. 2d 629, ¶5 ("the 2020 fall general election has essentially begun" and therefore "it is too late to grant petitioners any form of relief that would be feasible and that would not cause confusion and undue damage to both the Wisconsin electors who want to vote and the other candidates in all of the various races on the general election ballot."). We are not persuaded by the attempts of the respondents to explain why the shared reasoning of *Purcell* and *Hawkins* does not support the grant of the requested stay in this case.

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correct in their interpretations of relevant law. That correctness cannot be assumed, because that is the very question to be decided in the appeal. As we discussed above, that assumption is countered by our conclusion that there is more than a mere possibility that the movants will prevail on those merits.

In summary, as to the third and fourth factors, the more concrete harms of voter confusion and administrative difficulty are not countered by the assertion of any similarly concrete harms that may occur by continuing with the guidance that has already been in place during recent elections. So far as is shown to us in this litigation, earlier use of that guidance has not produced evidence of specific harms.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the motion for a stay because the movants have shown more than a mere possibility of success on the merits, have identified irreparable injury to the election system as a whole for the February 2022 election in the absence of a stay, and have refuted the respondents' assertions that a stay will cause harm to other interested parties and to the public interest.

The Commission's current request for relief seeks relief only through conclusion of the election set for February 15, 2022. We agree that the necessity for relief past that point has not yet been established. In other words, the relief we grant in this order expires on February 15, 2022, at which point, in the absence of further relief the Commission will be obliged to comply with the circuit court order.

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IT IS ORDERED that the motions for relief pending appeal are granted. The circuit court's order is stayed through February 15, 2022.

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals

FILED 01-20-2022 Clerk of Circuit Court Waukesha County 2021CV000958

DATE SIGNED: January 19, 2022

Electronically signed by Michael O. Bohren Circuit Court Judge

STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT WAUKESHA COUNTY BRANCH 1

RICHARD TEIGEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 21-CV-958

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION,

Defendant,

and

DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, et al.,

Defendant-Intervenors.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on June 28, 2021. They challenge the legal interpretations of several Wisconsin statutes by Defendant Wisconsin Elections Commission ("WEC") contained in two written memos, one dated March 31, 2020, attached to Plaintiffs' complaint as Exhibit A, ("March Memo"), and one dated August 19, 2020, attached to Plaintiffs' complaint as Exhibit B, ("August Memo") (collectively, "Memos").

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Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for preliminary injunction on October 15. Defendant Wisconsin Elections Commission, and Defendant-Intervenors Democratic Senate Campaign Committee ("DSCC"), Disability Rights Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice, and League of Women Voters of Wisconsin filed briefs in opposition on November 15, requesting summary judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs filed a reply on November 24. This Court heard arguments on the motions on January 13, 2022.

Having considered the parties briefs, affidavits, and arguments, and for the reasons stated on the record during the January 13 hearing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED** on all claims, Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is **DENIED** as moot, and Defendant's and Defendants-Intervenors' request for summary judgment in their favor is **DENIED**.

The Court HEREBY ISSUES a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction as follows:

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

For the reasons set forth by the Court on the record at the January 13, 2022 hearing, the Court hereby declares that WEC's interpretation of state statutes in the Memos is inconsistent with state law, to the extent they conflict with the following: (1) an elector must personally mail or deliver his or her own absentee ballot, except where the law explicitly authorizes an agent to act on an elector's behalf, (2) the only lawful methods for casting an absentee ballot pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. are for the elector to place the envelope containing the ballot in the mail or for the elector to deliver the ballot in person to the municipal clerk, (3) the use of drop boxes, as described in the Memos, is not permitted under Wisconsin law unless the drop box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated alternate site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855.

The Court further declares that WEC's Memos are administrative rules under Chapter 227 of the Wisconsin statutes and are invalid not only for the reasons described above, and but also because they should have been, but were not, promulgated as rules.

PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Defendant Wisconsin Elections Commission is HEREBY permanently enjoined as follows:

- 1. The Wisconsin Elections Commission shall not issue any further interpretations, to municipal clerks or anyone else, that conflicts with Wis. Stat. §§ 6.87 and 6.855, as described above.
- 2. No later than January 27, 2022, the Wisconsin Elections Commission shall withdraw the Memos and issue a statement to clerks notifying them that WEC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 6.87 and 6.855 in the Memos has been declared invalid by this Court, as described above.

THIS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF APPEAL

FILED 01-25-2022 Clerk of Circuit Court Waukesha County 2021CV000958

DATE SIGNED: January 24, 2022

Electronically signed by Michael O. Bohren Circuit Court Judge

STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT WAUKESHA COUNTY BRANCH 1

RICHARD TEIGEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 21-CV-958

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION,

Defendant,

and

DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, et al.,

Defendant-Intervenors.

ORDER DENYING STAY MOTION AND MODIFYING PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Defendant-Intervenors Disability Rights Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice, and League of Women Voters of Wisconsin filed an emergency motion, Dkt. 135, to stay this Court's order, Dkt. 142, until after both the February 15 spring primary election and the April 5 spring election. Plaintiffs filed a response to that motion, Dkt. 143, and this Court heard arguments

on that motion on January 21. Defendant Wisconsin Election Commission and Intervenor -Defendant Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee joined the motion.

Having considered the parties submissions and arguments, and for the reasons stated on the record during the January 21 hearing, the Court **HEREBY DENIES** Defendant-Intervenors' emergency motion for a stay.

Furthermore, for the reasons stated during the January 21 hearing, the Court HEREBY **MODIFIES** its prior order, Dkt. 142, such that the Wisconsin Elections Commission shall, no later than January 24, 2022, withdraw the Memos and issue a statement to clerks notifying them that WEC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 6.87 and 6.855 in the Memos has been declared invalid by this Court.

THE COURT: We should be back on the record in the Teigen, et al. versus the Wisconsin Elections

Commission, et al., file 21-CV-958. I see everybody, so

I'm assuming everybody can hear the Court. I see acknowledgments on it, so thank you.

During the brief recess we had, I took the opportunity to review my notes, read through the documents, read the memos again, looked at the statutes and reflected on the status of the case and I'm prepared to enter a ruling. During the course of my ruling, I'll refer to the statutes involved and to the memos as well.

But I just want to begin with the issue of standing. I'm satisfied that standing is controlled by Section 227.40, declaratory judgment proceedings. When I look at the -- just going to the two memos involved or the two documents that really bring the matter to court is that August 19, 2020 memorandum or memo or document from the Elections Commission, and a March 31, 2020 document.

When I referenced at the beginning of the hearing, I mentioned I had the affidavit with the two documents attached to it. Actually, the affidavit doesn't attach the August memorandum to it, so I have those documents from the complaint. So just it's clear, I have the right documents, the March 31, 2020 document and the August 19, 2020 document.

In the March 31, 2020 document it talks about -- it begins, "Due to the increase in by-mail absentee ballots, clerks have inquired about options for ensuring that the maximum number of ballots are returned to be counted for the April 7, 2020 election. There are several options the clerks can use to make the ballot return more accessible and efficient. It is recommended the clerks do the best they are able. To publicize dropoff locations and options for voters, it's further recommended that it be publicized to voters that under state law ballots need to be received by 8 p.m. on election day to be counted."

It then goes through a number of items. It doesn't call it a guidance or a memo. It doesn't really say anything. It just says, Here's the information, but I'm satisfied it's a guidance issued by the commission. The August 19th document that has been forwarded begins, "This document is intended to provide information and guidance on drop box options for secure absentee ballot return for voters." So there the word guidance is used specifically.

I refer to that because when you look at Section 227.40(1), "Except as provided in (2), the exclusive means of judicial review of the validity of a rule or guidance document shall be an action for

declaratory judgment as to the validity of the rule for a guidance document brought in to the circuit court for the county where the party asserting the invalidity is."

I'm satisfied when I look at that and look at the documents that are involved, the proper method to proceed is under 227.40. That's the venue or the avenue that was used to bring the lawsuit, so I'm satisfied that the standing issue is met and the plaintiff prevails with regard to the standing matter.

In looking then at the issues, we're addressing how the elections are administered, and in particular, we're referring to two particular statutes. We're looking at Section 6.87(4)(b)1; and also 6.855. Those are the two that I looked at and that the parties concentrated on.

The language in Section 6.88 is -- it's a long statute, but we've concentrated only on I think it was 21 words that were used during the argument. And that's toward the end of Subsection (1) and it says -- it talks about the envelopes and how it's done, and then it says, just looking at the pertinent language, The return envelope shall then be sealed. The witness may not be a candidate.

And then it goes on and states, "The envelope" -- that's the envelope with the ballot, the

absentee ballot -- "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector or delivered in person to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots."

The second statute that's involved is 6.855. That deals with alternate absentee ballot sites, and that states in Subsection (1), "The governing body of a municipality may elect to designate a site other than the office of the municipal clerk or board of election commissioners as the location from which electors of the municipality may request and vote absentee ballots and which to voted absentee ballots shall be returned by electors for any election. The designated site shall be located as near as practicable to the office of the municipal clerk or board of commissioners, and no site may be designated to afford an advantage to any political party."

In Subsection (3) it states, "An alternate site under one shall be staffed by the municipal clerk or the executive director of the board of election commissioners or employees or the clerk or the board of commissioners."

Sub. (4) significantly states, "An alternate site under one shall be accessible to all of the individuals with disabilities."

Sub. (5) states, "The governing body may

designate more than one alternate site under Sub. (1), but there's a clear procedure. They call it alternate sites to collect ballots, other than at what may be the actual office of the municipal clerk.

There's another section that's important, and that's Section 6.84. That address construction of the election statutes. We talked about it briefly during the presentation, but I want to emphasize the language in it, and the public policy that the legislature has set forth for the election statutes.

First, it says in Sub.(1), 6.84(1),

Legislative Policy, the legislature finds that voting is a

constitutional right, the rigorous exercising of which

shall be strongly encouraged. In contrast, voting by

absentee ballot is a privilege exercised wholly outside

the traditional safeguards of the polling place.

The legislature finds that the privilege of voting by absentee ballot must be carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse, to prevent overzealous solicitation of absent electors who may prefer not to participate in an election, to prevent undue influence on the absent elector to vote for or against a candidate, or to cast a particular vote in a referendum or other similar abuses.

Subsection (2) is entitled Interpretation.

It states, "Notwithstanding section 5.01(1) with respect to matters relating to the absentee voting process,

Section 6.86, 6.87(3) to (7); and 9.01(1)(b) (2) and (4),

shall be construed as mandatory. Ballots cast in

contravention of the procedures specified in those

provisions may not be counted. Ballots counted in

contravention of the procedures specified in those

provisions may not be included in the certified result

then of any election.

All important policy considerations to be considered by the Court and by the attorneys in making the arguments in this case. Certainly I want to thank the attorneys for the briefing that was done, the intense briefing and intense arguments today, the arguments, the strength of the arguments from all parties is appreciated, and I think it's been very well presented.

Your respective clients have been well represented by each of the attorneys in presenting their case today. We focused — today we focus on absentee ballots and how they're received and how they come to the clerk. When I read through Section 6.84 on the construction issue, I particularly look to what happens at an election when they talk about the vigorous exercise — voting is a constitutional right, the vigorous exercise of which should be strongly encouraged.

I think then about voting. We haven't talked about the process of in-person voting, but it's really an adjunct to our process today. When a person goes to vote, the person identifies who that person is, checked off, the person is given a ballot. And I'm old enough, I used to vote with paper ballots. They'd give me a paper ballot, we'd go into the booth with a pencil and check off what we wanted to do with the vote, and then turn it back in. But we turned it in and it went into the receptacle.

Today when we vote, it's usually by electronic voting machines, but after you've been checked in and been identified, the clerk gives the person the ballot. The person goes in and votes, checks off whatever they want to check off, do the voting, and then the person comes back and the person puts it through the electronic voting machine. He doesn't hand it to anybody else, puts it through the voting machine. So the elector, the voter, is always in possession of that ballot as it functions and as it goes into the ballot box.

With absentee ballots, as the legislative policy notes, they consider that a privilege. It's not the same as coming in person. They're giving the ballot to a person, the person votes, not at the voting place but usually at their home or some other location, and then

that ballot has to get back to the voting operation, to the municipal clerk, to the ballot clerk. That's what we're talking about today and how important that process is.

In looking at the first statute that we've dealt with, which is (1) of 6.87, I have the wording again, The envelope shall be mailed — shall be mailed by the elector or delivered in person to the municipal clerk. There's been some disagreement between the parties as to what delivered means.

I'm satisfied in reading that sentence that when it says, "the envelope shall be mailed by the elector or delivered in person," that means that it's the elector that delivers it in person, not somebody else. I don't see any language in the statute that provides a basis for having agents, somebody other than the elector, actually deliver the ballot.

And that's been a controversy that is key to the Plaintiff's case and it's certainly key to the Defense, to the Election Commissions's case and those that support the commission. In reading that statute and looking at the, if you will, the ritual for voting in person, and if you will, the ritual for voting by absentee, it requires the elector to be principally involved. It doesn't require other people to be involved.

And one of the concerns with certainly the public policy in 684 is that the elector has to control the ballot and control how its cast. And on that basis then, I'm satisfied that the provisions in the memorandums that permit other individuals to take — to receive the ballot and then to bring it back into the municipal clerk's office is contrary to the statute.

In the March 31, 2020 memo, on Page 1, Section 2, the title of it is, Can voters return an absentee ballot they received by mail in person at the clerk's office, in-person absentee site, or polling place on election day. In that paragraph that follows, it says that ballots can be returned to the clerk's office in person, absentee, or early voting site or the voter's polling place on election day.

Then quoting, A family member or another person may also return the ballot on behalf of the voter. I don't see anything in the statute that says that. In reading the statute, the statute is clear. It's not ambiguous. It's not necessary to go to outside sources to determine how that return of the ballot — return of the ballot is addressed.

In looking back a few minutes ago in my discussion of the electoral process and the importance of the elector's personal involvement in delivering the

ballot, to permit other people to bring the ballot in is contrary to what I think is the clear wording of the statute but also contrary to the policy behind the statute and as it's worded.

So I'm satisfied that in that respect, those portions of the memorandum that address that other people may bring the ballot in, it doesn't have to be the elector, are contrary to the statute.

What we spent considerable time on is the issue of drop boxes. In looking at the statutes, there is no specific authorization for drop boxes. The closest that the Court has heard is that the statute for the alternate ballot placement, the alternate sites, under 6.855 is an alternate ballot site, and the practicality of proceeding with a ballot, with a secure ballot box in a clerk's office, that's manned by a staffer or an alternate absentee ballot site that's manned by a person from the clerk's office or the voting governing body's office.

There's nothing else that authorizes the use of a drop box. Now, when I look at, in particular, both memos address drop boxes with some detail. There is a -- somebody well thought out the issue of drop boxes, well-thought-out issues then with regard to the security of drop boxes, how they're to be managed in the August 19, 2020 memo. There's just details about how drop box are

handled, where they're put, types of drop boxes, outdoor action -- outdoor options. I'm not going to read everything that's in the memo, but it's the subtitles. What is an absentee ballot drop box.

In looking at that first section, what is an absentee ballot drop box, it never talks about it really being in the clerk's office or the municipality's office. It says, A ballot drop box provides a secure and convenient means for voters to return their by-mail absentee ballot. A drop box is a secure, locked structure operated by local election officials.

It doesn't say where it is. It doesn't follow the statute with regard to an alternate site. It really, as we've talked today, it could be virtually anyplace. Then it talks about the repurposing options, then it goes to types of drop boxes, outdoor options, indoor options, then security.

And then it shows, for instance, on Page 3 of the August 19 memo is a picture apparently from the City of Waukesha of an official absentee drop box. All of that is good and nice, but there's no authority to do it. It would appear that the election laws in Wisconsin are very specific, very detailed as to what happens. It's not — the law in the statutes don't say, we'll have an election at certain times and we'll have ballots, and the

municipal clerk, it's up to the clerks to figure out how to do it. That's really not the case. These are very specific statutes on how to do things, primarily to protect the integrity of the system.

I go back to the ritual, if you will, of voting in person. It's really carried over to a great extent to the ritual of voting with an absentee ballot. So I'm satisfied there's no authority, no statutory authority, to issue — to have drop boxes used for the collection of absentee ballots, other than as an alternate absentee ballot site and following that process under 6.855.

In looking then at the nature of this lawsuit, I'm satisfied that the Plaintiffs prevail on their motion for summary judgment. I'm satisfied there's no basis under the statutes. The statutes control for the method to have others bring the ballots in, for the elector, and to use drop boxes other than as set forth in 7.855.

I'm also concerned with the issue of the -we've talked to some extent about the rule designations
and about making up a rule. I'm satisfied that this issue
is that the memorandums, that the guidance memorandums,
both that we've dealt with in this case are actually
rules, unpromulgated rules by the Elections Commission.

They should have gone through the process set forth in Chapter 227, in particular in Section 227.10.

I'm just taking a moment to -- I just want to review the issues with regard to the rule promulgation. When you read the documents that the Elections Commission issued, it really is a rule on how to conduct elections; in particular, how in particular to conduct and collect absentee ballots. With the specificity and the integrity with which the legislature has addressed the issue of absentee ballots, that the commission should be required and ought to be required to more carefully follow the traditional mandates of Wisconsin law when they make major policy decisions.

And I see nothing other than the issue as to who turns the ballot in and the drop boxes are major policy decisions that alter how our absentee ballot process operates. When I looked at these two memos and the documents and the rules and the guidance that are contained within them, I'm satisfied that they do constitute a standard statement of policy and a general order. I'm satisfied that they have general application. They really cover elections across the state and they cover them very specifically, altering what has been and setting a new standard, if you will, and a new policy for how absentee ballots are then collected.

They have the effect of law. Although it's been argued and I think it's true that the municipal clerks can follow or not follow it, but remember the clerk, if they do it, they're going to say, I have this memo that says I can do it. They're going to rely upon it as a statement of law.

I'm satisfied these policy statements by the commission were issued as, in fact, their view of interpreting what the statute means and has the force of law with regard to their interpretation. I'm satisfied that reasonable municipal clerks who address elections will adhere to those policies. I think as we went through some of the briefing and the statements by others as to how these policies have been implemented, that's what the clerks did.

There is certainly -- it's issued by an agency and it was issued to implement, interpret or make specific legislative action enforced or administered by the agency, but there is no legislation. There's nothing there. This matter should have come through a rule, the rule-making process. That is really to a great extent set forth in -- there are two Palm decisions, Tavern League v. Palm, 2021 WI 33, there's also one from 2020.

I looked at the case, the 2021 WI 33, particularly at Paragraph 19, talks about these very

issues and the need to have documents like this policy statement by agencies, either not used or adopted as a rule, and give the legislative process and the entire government an opportunity to review what the agency is doing.

I just want to take a moment to look at the Palm case. In Paragraph 19 of the Palm decision, the court said, quoting, We further — they're now referring back to the first Palm decision in 2020 — "We further explained that agency action that exhibits all of the following criteria meets the definition of a rule: One, a regulation, standard, statement of policy, or general order; two, of general application; three, having the effect of law; four, issued by an agency; five, to implement, interpret, or make specific legislation enforced or administered by such agency."

That's clearly what happened in both of these memos. They fit the definition of a rule exactly. There was some discussion about when we talked about standing as to the issues as to local municipalities acting versus the State of Wisconsin Election Commission acting. Well, here the commission regulates and governs elections.

They issued these memos, I can only assume, not because they had nothing better do, but they issued it

to give specific instructions to municipalities on how they should conduct elections, and in particular, how to collect absentee ballots, a critical issue obviously and a critical issue from the standpoint of the intervening parties in this case as well. The issue of election security, the issue of election integrity is key, and when you deal with — when you address absentee ballots, it's even more critical for all of the reasons that you have absentee ballots.

So I'm satisfied that it is a rule. They were proposed rules and they should have gone through the rule-making policy. It's another basis for the Court to grant summary judgment to the Plaintiff. I'll grant their motion. I'll deny the motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendant.

As part of the complaint, the Plaintiff's complaint, they've also requested an affirmative injunction requiring that the Wisconsin Elections

Commission cease and desist from failing to enforce 6.84,

6.855, and 6.87(4)(b)1. I'll include that in my order and I grant that injunction. So ordered.

I'll ask Attorney Berg to draft the necessary order and submit it to the court. I hold orders for ten calendar days if they come in without a statement that the other parties agree to it as to form or the other

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memorandums.

parties communicate that they agree to it as to form. Otherwise, I hold it for ten calendar days. Keep in mind our system is all electronic, so when it comes in, if it comes in without an assertion that it's been agreed to as to form, it just gets put into the holding pattern in the digital system. So any questions from the Plaintiff? MR. BERG: So the Court just articulated the scope of the injunction that it intends to issue, so I can fully represent that in an order? THE COURT: Yes. You asked me, you said I did or I should? MR. BERG: Can you? THE COURT: Well, the injunction I'm issuing is to require the enforcement of the statute named in your complaint. I'll prohibit -- part of the injunction is I will prohibit the further distribution of the two memos and further prohibit the distribution and

Some of the wording in the memorandums may not be objectionable. Most of the statements contained in the memorandums are contrary to the Court's ruling today. So ordered.

promulgation of the guidance contained in those two

Anything from the commission?

1	MR. BERG: Your Honor, one more thing.
2	THE COURT: Go ahead.
3	MR. BERG: One further thing we requested
4	in our injunction is to order the commission to correct
5	their statement to the clerks within a certain amount of
6	time.
7	THE COURT: I'll require that the
8	commission promulgate a statement that the policy guidance
9	contained in the two memorandums is withdrawn and do so
10	within 30 days of today's date. So ordered. Thank you.
11	Anything from the commission?
12	MR. KILPATRICK: With that clarification,
13	Your Honor, no, nothing from the commission.
14	THE COURT: Anything from the Democratic
15	Senate Campaign Committee, Attorney Devaney?
16	MR. DEVANEY: No, thank you, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Anything from Mr. Thompson?
18	MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor. I
19	understand that this Court's order is well, let me
20	phrase it as a question. The interveners identified
21	Purcell, a United States Supreme Court decision regarding
22	election administration rulings that are issued
23	immediately prior to an election. As I am sure the Court
24	is aware, we're about 30 days from the upcoming spring
25	election, and the whole purpose of Purcell is sort of
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avoiding confusion amongst the electorate as they go to 1 2 cast ballots. 3 So I am curious if the Court, based on that 30-day timeline that was just referenced, intends for any 4 5 sort of order to go into place before or after the spring election? 6 7 THE COURT: Well, the spring election is, what, the 16th or the 17th of February? 8 MR. THOMPSON: It's right around there. 9 THE COURT: Let me just look. It's a 10 Tuesday, so is it the third Tuesday of February? 11 MR. BERG: February 15th. 12 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to order that 13 14 the memorandum, the order withdrawing their statements contained in these two memos -- I'm looking for my 15 16 calendar -- I'm going to order that it be issued within 14 days of today's date. That puts it closer to the 17 18 election, but I think within practicality I have to give the commission time to work through it and get the 19 20 paperwork ready. Fourteen days from today date, today is the 21 13th, that would be January 27th. Let me see what I've 22 got here, today is the 13th, so January 27th is a 23 Thursday. The election day is the 15th. That's the 24 25 third Tuesday. So I'm satisfied it gives sufficient time

for the clerks to get the message and to follow the statutes.

You know, in reality, the statutes are not difficult to follow. They may have -- clerks may have perhaps improvidently focused on these memorandums without thinking it through, but they now have fairly clear guidance, so thank you.

MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Do you have anything else,

Attorney Thompson?

MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, I was just going to say in order to preserve the record, that the intervener defendants I represent would submit that such an order is too adjacent or close to the upcoming election to survive that *Purcell* decision. Thank you.

THE COURT: I am hopeful that our clerks will be diligent and the Election Commission -- actually, this is an Election Commission issue and that the Election Commission will be diligent in moving forward.

Thank you again. The briefing was excellent. The arguments were very good. From an intellectual standpoint, I enjoyed the arguments and the briefing. It's a good issue. It's a very important issue. I want to thank you for your assistance with it. Thank you. With that, everybody have a good week and stay

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        STATE OF WISCONSIN
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        COUNTY OF WAUKESHA
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                              I, ROSE MARIE RODERICK, certify that I am
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              the official court reporter assigned to report the
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              proceedings herein for the Circuit Court; that the
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              foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 100 inclusive, have
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              been carefully compared by me with my stenographic notes;
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              that the same is a true and correct transcript of all such
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              proceedings taken on the 13<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2022.
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                              Dated this 20<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2022.
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                                               Official Court Reporter
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STATE OF WISCONSIN

CIRCUIT COURT

WAUKESHA COUNTY

Branch 1

RICHARD TEIGEN, et al.,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

File No. 2021-CV-000958

WISCONSIN ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

MOTION HEARING

Proceeding held on January 21, 2022

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL O. BOHREN CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, PRESIDING

APPEARANCES

LUKE N. BERG, Attorney at Law, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

STEVEN CARL KILPATRICK, Attorney at Law, appeared on behalf of Defendant, Wisconsin Election Commission.

JOHN M. DEVANEY, Attorney at Law, appeared on behalf of Defendant, Democratic Senate Campaign Committee.

SCOTT THOMPSON, Attorney at Law, appeared on behalf of Defendants, Disability Rights of Wisconsin, Faith Voices for Justice, and the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin.

ROSE MARIE RODERICK Official Court Reporter

1 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: The Court will call the matter 3 of Richard Teigen, Richard Thom versus Wisconsin Election 4 Commission; Intervening Defendant, Democrat Senate 5 Campaign Committee; Intervening Defendants, League of 6 Wisconsin -- League of Women Voters of Wisconsin; 7 Disability Rights of Wisconsin; and Faith Voices for 8 Justice, 21-CV-935. This is a motion hearing. All 9 appearances today are by Zoom. We are Live streaming the 10 proceedings as well. 11 So who appears for the Plaintiffs 12 today? 13 MR. BERG: Luke Berg with the Wisconsin 14 Institute for Law and Liberty on behalf of Plaintiffs. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. Good afternoon. 16 Who appears for the Elections Commission? 17 MR. KILPATRICK: Assistant Attorney 18 General, Steven Kilpatrick, with the Wisconsin Department 19 of Justice, for the defendant, Wisconsin Election 20 Commission. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Who appears for the the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee? 22 23 MR. DEVANEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor, 24 John Devaney on behalf of the DSCC. THE COURT: Thank you. Good afternoon. 25

Who appears for the League of Wisconsin Women Voters of Wisconsin, Disability Rights of Wisconsin, and Faith Voices for Justice.

MR. THOMPSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Scott Thompson from Law Forward appears on behalf of those intervener defendants.

THE COURT: Thank you. Good afternoon.

Thank you for being able to come in a half-hour later.

The morning calendar lasted longer than we anticipated,

but we're here today on the motion filed by the

intervening defendants. I'm going to call them the League

Group just for shorthand. That's Attorney Thompson's

group.

We met here on the 19th, on Wednesday, to schedule it. We put it off to this afternoon to give Plaintiffs an opportunity to respond. I did receive yesterday a timely Plaintiff response, and I have received nothing else with regard to the motion.

So with that then, I'm prepared to proceed and I'll hear from Attorney Thompson.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I'd just like to acknowledge here from the outset that our two-page motion received an eleven-page response, so I'm going to structure my argument to somewhat mirror the way that Plaintiffs presented their arguments, mostly

for the Court's convenience, and sort of follow them in that order.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BERG: Of course. So your Honor, there are three key issues I would like to rebut from the Plaintiff's motion. They make three central arguments, all of which this Court should disregard, and I'm going to start with the first one. Defendants argue that *Purcell*, which is the United States Supreme Court decision upon which our motion is premised, that it applies only to federal courts.

THE COURT: You said Defendants, I think you meant the Plaintiffs.

MR. THOMPSON: I certainly did. Thanks for catching me there, Your Honor. Late on Friday, hopefully it will be the last one.

THE COURT: That's okay. We're all understanding.

MR. THOMPSON: Appreciate it. Your Honor, regardless, *Purcell* is not limited to federal courts.

That's true for four reasons: First, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on voting rights issues like this one are supreme in Waukesha County and everywhere else in our country. *Purcell* weighs on the protection of the right to vote. The core policy concern,

as Plaintiffs concede, is with threats to voter confusion, that the voter is the issue. This is indisputably federal constitutional grounds to which the Supreme Court has the final say, and say it has.

Now practically speaking, this concern about voter confusion exists, regardless of whether it is a federal court or state court hearing the dispute. And it makes sense that the Supreme Court's direction from Purcell applies here today. Second, the Purcell decision is not self-limiting. You will find nothing in the language of the Purcell decision confining its rules too federal courts.

Defendants have -- strike that. Plaintiffs have not offered anything that would rewrite or limit <code>Purcell</code>. Frankly, there is nothing that has rewritten or limited <code>Purcell</code>. There is no subsequent decision affirmatively ruling that it can be ignored by state courts. That's just not the law.

Now relevant here, the operating language from *Purcell*, what we're really concerned about, it actually mirrors the scenario before this court. *Purcell* concerned a situation like here where a lower court had issued an injunction. The relevant portion reads: "Given the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, our action today shall of

necessity allow the election to proceed without an injunction."

Now, the factual dispute in *Purcell*, at least as it was pending at that moment, was largely over potential voter disenfranchisement, so that's key. The only difference here between *Purcell* and the instant case weighs in favor of a stay and my clients, because the only evidence in the record demonstrates that undoubtedly this decision will trigger disenfranchisement in Wisconsin. Third, although subsequent decisions generally describe *Purcell* in relation to federal courts, this must not be mistaken for a new decision that truncated or otherwise limited *Purcell*.

Again, no one has rewritten that decision.

It makes sense, Your Honor, that subsequent decisions

would refer to *Purcell's* relationship with federal courts.

It makes sense as dicta. And that's because most

challenges to election law and voting rights are filed in

federal courts, who generally oversee this variety of

constitutional questions.

Finally, if there was any doubt, Your

Honor, on *Purcell's* application in Wisconsin, I argue that

our Supreme Court has removed it. The Wisconsin Supreme

Court has invoked *Purcell* repeatedly, once in a

controlling opinion that assessed the viability of the

state election statute, that was Milwaukee branch of the NAACP v. Walker, 2014 WI 98, Paragraph 94; twice in a dissents that were offered by Justice Grassl Bradley last year. That was in Zignego v. WEC case and the Trump v. Biden case.

In total, Your Honor, it's clear that Purcell certainly applies in the circumstance, and the practical concern, the policy concerns, about voter confusion are going to be present, regardless if a federal court is intervening in an election statute right before an election or if it's a state court. We can all recognize that no matter who's making the ruling, the people of Wisconsin are going to be affected.

The second larger point, Your Honor,
Plaintiffs argue that Purcell is designed to prevent
changing the law. Plaintiffs argue that this court has
not changed the law, so Purcell is irrelevant. Ultimately
what this question is about, Your Honor, is about what the
world was like two weeks ago before this Court issued its
decision. What was the status quo and did it change, did
this court change the law.

In a case that the Plaintiffs cited out of the Fourth Circuit, *Wise v. Circosta*, the court said it's state decisions that establish the status quo. So Your Honor, I want to take you through the state decisions that

demonstrate that the status quo is not the law in relation to how this court ruled last week.

Former Governor Scott Walker signed the 2015 Wisconsin Act 118 in December of 2015. This act created the Elections Commission. This act, this decision, vested the Election Commissions with the power to administer our elections. This body, through its administrator, issued the guidance documents in 2020. The status quo ante here, Your Honor, is in these guidance documents. And the legislature of the State of Wisconsin certainly agreed.

In a letter dated September 25, 2020, after both the relevant guidance documents were issued through Counsel Assembly Speaker Robin Vos and former State Senate Leader Scott Fitzgerald wrote to the Municipal clerk of Madison and said, I quote, Voters may deposit their completed absentee ballots in authorized drop boxes, which must be secured and locked at all times to protect ballot integrity.

They went on, "We wholeheartedly support voters' use of any of these convenient, secure, and expressly authorized absentee ballot return methods." So the governor authorized the Elections Commission to issue this guidance. The state legislature clearly understood that it complied with the law.

Now Plaintiffs, they try to conceal this as best as they can, but even the language in their brief reflects a change in the law. On Page 5 of their brief they sort of inartfully claim that this court has, quote, unquote, restored as opposed to changed the laws.

Anyone who has restored anything can tell you the process of restoration is one of change. And Plaintiff's other representations to this court confirm this. Plaintiff's counsel went so far as to request that this Court take judicial notice of the fact that drop boxes exist in Plaintiff's community. Now, they had to do this because Plaintiffs testified that they had no idea if there were drop boxes in their community.

And again, one of the Plaintiffs doesn't know who the Elections Commission is and, before he was deposed, had never even looked at the guidance documents. So drop boxes exist in our communities, it's undisputed. I think our court might have taken judicial notice of that fact. The status quo, Your Honor, will change as a result of this Court's ruling.

Now, it's important to recognize that the change here is the result not of a new statute, Your Honor, but it's a result of how this court has construed a statute. So until this Court ruled, this was not clearly the law. Plaintiffs themselves submitted an affidavit in

support of their summary judgment motion to this court
where they said they were confused about what the law was.

Your Honor, other examples crystalize this point. One that I think is extremely helpful is actually qualified immunity. In qualified immunity, a court has to ask two questions: First, was the constitution violated; second, was it clear that the violation was known to the police officer or the violator when it occurred. Now, this is a perspective standard. It's overlooked. It recognizes that when the Supreme Court of the United States, for example, construes the Fourth Amendment, it provides new standards that police officers must follow.

That doesn't mean that the language of the Fourth Amendment is changing, but it certainly means that the law is changing. The same is true here. When this Court construes our election laws for the first time, our understanding changes. The law has changed. Again, former Governor Walker, in concert with the legislature, made a decision to create the Elections Commission and empower it to administer our election.

The State itself, through the Department of Justice, is here defending the case. The legislature itself has the power, if it so decides, to intervene on its own and provide its own expression of its position. It has refused to do so. The only people identified in

the record, Your Honor, who understood or believed this law was as it is now construed under this Court's previous ruling are the two voters in Waukesha, against literally everybody else.

So in order to follow the direction of the Supreme Court of the United States in recognition of the change of the law, that is now just weeks away from the next election, this Court should stay the decision as requested.

And finally, Your Honor, I want to touch on confusion. Plaintiffs make the argument that *Purcell*, even if it does apply, there's no confusion in the record because the state law is clear. Again, first, the Plaintiffs themselves have testified in the complete opposite direction, submitting an affidavit to this court saying that they were confused about the law. So that's just simply not true. In fact, its undisputed.

As was raised here during our summary judgment motions, confusion is everywhere because we have a direct conflict between our state law and a federal law. 52USC10508 is a controlling federal law signed into effect by, I believe, President George W. Bush. It demands, "Any voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of disability may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice."

Now, that is in direct contravention of the state of the law as it is today. There is certainly confusion amongst certainly the people in this room, as well as the clerks of the State of Wisconsin. So making this problem worse, the Plaintiffs continue to just gesture wildly at Wisconsin statutes, claiming that somewhere in there, Your Honor, you're going to find exceptions that are going to prevent the massive disfranchisement that we're concerned about.

Now, as our affidavits identified for this court, the key group who will lose the right to vote are those who are confined in their homes and are unable to use their limbs or body to return their ballots to vote, to be counted. Now, Plaintiffs offer this court and repeatedly offers a set of statutes that they claim will resolve these problems.

To make this point crystal clear, I'm going to go through all of them for everybody today. The first one is 6.82(1). That's about helping someone vote at a polling place. I don't think it has anything to do with absentee ballots. The second is 6.82(2). That's in marking a ballot at a polling place. Again, they have submitted something that has nothing to do with absentee ballots.

They then go to 6.86(1)(ag). That's about

aid in applying to simply receive a ballot. Again, nothing about returning the ballot. Then they point to 6.86(2). That's about requesting a ballot to be delivered to the place where you live. Nothing about returning the ballot. Then they point to 6.86(3). This section has to do only with hospitalized electors, not to those Wisconsinites or to whom the right to vote requires someone else to help them to return their ballot from their house.

The next is 6.87(5). This only has to do with marking a ballot, not returning it, which again is the key provision being construed in this case. The next provision, 6.87(5), has to do with a subset of residential care facilities and retirement homes. Again, nothing to help Wisconsinites who are in their homes who don't have the same bodily capabilities to return a ballot in the mail or in person as other folks in Wisconsin.

Those are all the provisions they've offered this court. Literally none of them help this situation, none of them. They do now identify a website they found from the postal service about door delivery, and I want to point this out as well. This has nothing to do with ballot return as far as the submission to the court, as far as the website they provided.

This has to do with making sure that mail

can be dropped off at someone's door. It has nothing to do with going into someone's house and helping them retrieve their mail, should they not be able to get to the door on their own. And then I think they cross the line, Your Honor, frankly.

Plaintiffs argue to this court that none of the affidavits allege any confusion. No confusion. In a country where voting is one of the most key aspects to life for what it means to be an American, central to why people volunteer for the armed services, these affidavits demonstrate that these people cannot vote. And as the Plaintiffs claim, there is no confusion. They cannot vote.

Again, this is beyond the line. There are -- it is undisputed in the record. There are people across the State of Wisconsin who believe they cannot vote. February 15 will come and go and they will be disenfranchised. That cannot stand, Your Honor.

Now, in the interim, it's key that in line with the Supreme Court decision from *Purcell*, that this decision be stayed so this confusion can be resolved so that we can figure out how these people can actually vote. The Supreme Court is clear, the deadline is not disputed. February 15th is the election. And I think the Court can even take judicial notice of the fact that there is

confusion. There's been significant public coverage of the fact that municipal clerks have no idea really what to do. So all of the prerequisites of *Purcell* are met, the risk of Wisconsin voters is extreme, and Your Honor, I would encourage this Court to enter a stay to prevent such confusion on the eve of an election. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'll go to Attorney Kilpatrick.

MR. KILPATRICK: Thank you, Your Honor. I will be as brief as I can. The Wisconsin Elections

Commission joins the league interveners' emergency motion for stay of this court's ruling, at least -- in the commission's position, at least through the February 15th election.

The commission does not understand the emergency motion to be a full motion for a stay pending the entire appeal but an emergency basis only, and the commission joins in that. The commission again agrees with the defendant interveners that *Purcell* does apply and the reasoning applies. The *Purcell* court has given the opinion that courts should not change the election rules close to an election.

And again, February 15th is election day of the spring primary, but there are some statutes that show that the election likely is already underway with

regard to absentee ballots. In the league's motion, they referenced Wis. Stat. 7.15(1)(cm), and that is the statute that talks about the deadline by which municipal clerks send out absentee ballots for those electors who have already requested one. And that's the deadline. It's not the first day, it's the last day.

And another statute, 7.10(3)(a) governs when county clerks deliver ballots to those municipal clerks, and that deadline is 22 days before the spring primary and that's January 24th. So it is quite possible that, as of right now, according to the statutes, county clerks have delivered absentee ballots to municipal clerks and it is possible that municipal clerks have sent out absentee ballots to those electors who have requested some. By January 25th, that will be the deadline, and we're almost guaranteed that that will happen.

So for those reasons, the commission urges a stay, because not only is this close to an election, it may be in the midst of an election as with regard to absentee voters. And following the *Purcell* principle, the Court should stay its decision to minimize voter confusion. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Then on to the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee.

MR. DEVANEY: Thank you, Your Honor. John

Devaney of the DSCC. I'll be very brief. We join in the motion, and the only point I would add is we ask that if the Court does grant a stay, that the Court make it expressly clear i17 the stay order that the WEC's guidance with respect to both issues involving the delivering of ballots and use of drop boxes remain in effect while the stay is in place. And that's all I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Then on to Attorney Berg.

MR. BERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

want to begin by emphasizing that the change we're talking about by the commission in these memos is a recent change. It happened in the last two years during COVID.

Defendants would have this Court believe that hundreds and thousands of voters are going to be disenfranchised if this court returns the state of the law to what it was before the commissioner illegally changed the law.

But people in Wisconsin voted in many elections before these changes were made without drop boxes and had no problem with voting. No cases were brought alleging that people were disenfranchised under the law that existed before the commission's illegal memo, at least on this topic. So the idea that all sorts of people will be disfranchised if we return to the rules that were in place for years before COVID just is not

possible.

As to stay, Your Honor, our position is that the Defendants are applying the wrong standard. The proper standard for a stay in Wisconsin courts is set forth in *Gudenschwager*, it's a well-known standard, likelihood of success on appeal, irreparable harm to either side, and the public interest. The interveners don't even attempt to apply that standard. Here they argue only under *Purcell*, which is not even applicable here for reasons I'll get to.

First I want go through the stay factors, as they should be applied. First, the Defendants and the defendant interveners have little-to-no likelihood of success on appeal. The law is not complicated here. It's only a few words, and those words are very straightforward. Ballots have to be mailed by the elector and delivered in person to the municipal clerk. It's not a complicated case.

Second, the harm and public interest weigh heavily against a stay. The legislature has already told us in 6.84 that strict adherence to the absentee voting procedures is critically important, so is the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In Jefferson v. Dane County, it quickly issued an injunction against unlawful guidance issued by the Madison and Milwaukee clerks and then in its opinion

later stated that the proper interpretation and application of election procedure is a matter of great public importance.

Purcell too says that states have a compelling interest in the integrity of their election process. And they know that there is simply no way to undo an election that's been conducted in violation of state law. So for all those reasons, there's significant irreparable harm and harm to the public interest if this court grants a stay, because it will mean multiple more elections conducted under rules that are inconsistent with state law.

Finally, there's no harm from following state law. This is not a particularly complicated issue. It won't be hard for clerks to adjust. They can simply remove any illegal drop boxes or cover them up. They can put a sign on them, send a notice to voters, and if any voter happens to show up at a drop box, they can read the sign and they can deliver their ballot in one of two other simple ways; they can mail it or they can drop it off at the clerk's office.

Finally, I'll just emphasize SCIU and Palm, which we cited in our brief, which both show how the Wisconsin Supreme Court thinks about a stay in the context of an ultra vires policy or law. It should be a very high

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bar to allow such a policy or law to be in place when it's been declared illegal.

Finally, turning to Purcell, as we've argued in our brief, Purcell does not apply to state courts. Now, Mr. Thompson argues that this is a U.S. Supreme Court opinion and invokes the supremacy clause, but he misunderstands our federal system. Supreme Court does not have general supervisory authority over the administration of the state courts.

The Purcell principle is a pragmatic rule of court administration about when to grant a stay, and the U.S. Supreme Court certainly has control over federal courts, but it does not have control over state courts. State courts can have different rules for when to grant a stay and when not to grant a stay.

Now, maybe Purcell applies when there is a federal election coming up. Some justices and judges have argued for that in dissents, but there is no federal election at stake here. This is a state election. We're talking about state election rules and we're talking about the test for a stay in state court.

No Wisconsin court, certainly not the Wisconsin Supreme Court, has adopted the Purcell principle. Now, Mr. Thompson cites three cases that he says did adopt the Purcell principle. There are three

cases citing *Purcell*, but not a single one of them actually adopted the rule with respect to stays.

They cited *Purcell* only for general principles of voter fraud. So the first case he cited *NAACP v. Walker*, Paragraph 74, all it says is — citing *Purcell* — voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government. It cited *Purcell* for the principle that we are bringing this case forth, which is enforcing and following state law. He did not cite *Purcell* to adopt its principle with respect to the law. It's simply not true that Wisconsin law has adopted that principle.

We've also cited a Fourth Circuit case, en banc, which held that Purcell doesn't apply to state courts, and we cited a U.S. Supreme Court case. There were two Supreme Court cases actually, one that denied an injunction and one that granted an injunction. The one that denied an injunction was when the state court made a change to election laws right before an election. The court denied an injunction and Justice Roberts explained that the rule is different when a state court makes a change versus a federal court. So the first reason Purcell does not apply is because it doesn't bind state courts.

The second reason is it doesn't apply when

a court simply enforces state law. Defendants have not cited a single case where *Purcell* has been applied in that context. It doesn't make any sense in that context. The justification for *Purcell* is separation of power principles. The courts should not change the law on the eve of an election. That's not what's happening here. The court is simply enforcing state law.

Finally, even if *Purcell* applied, there is no confusion here. This is, again, a simple change to make. It's not hard for people to understand there are two simple ways to return a ballot, mailing it or delivering it person. And clerks can notify voters of that, so there's no risk that voters will be confused in the next month. And there's plenty of time to make this change before the February 15th election.

Finally, the last point I would like to make is that Mr. Thompson has alleged that it is undisputed in the record that many voters will be disenfranchised if this court does not grant a stay. Presumably he is referring to the affidavits that he submitted two days ago that we had less than 24 hours to respond to.

Respectfully, Your Honor, our positon is that it is not appropriate for them to submit this evidence at this late stage in the case, pad the record

for appeal, make it seem as if that evidence is undisputed
when we've had no chance or reasonable opportunity to
dispute it. That's simply not fair.

And none of the affidavits clearly show that these voters would not be covered by some other exception or provision under the law. The point for citing the other exceptions under the law for disabled voters is simply to show that there are a lot of different ways for voters to vote. There are a lot of methods that make it easier. So for each of these voters, what a court would have to determine in an as-applied challenge — this is not it — would be, is there some gap, are there some voters for which none of these exceptions apply and they truly have no way to vote under state law.

Interveners haven't shown that, and even if they could show that, they would need to show that in a separate case. And it would require, at most, an as-applied exception for one or two voters, not a wholesale change in state law. This case is about the default rule under state law for all Wisconsin voters. This Court has already declared the law and it should allow the law to be in place for upcoming elections. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Back to Attorney Thompson.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor. I'll try to be brief. Thankfully, attorney for Plaintiff referred to this exercise as a quote-unquote simple change to make. Let it be clear for this court, that this would be a change in election law.

Your Honor, I would like this Court to understand, the justification of *Purcell* is not separation of powers. I would encourage anyone to simply read the case. It's not very long. It only has to do with voter confusion. Counsel for Plaintiffs suggested there were no suits before the 2020 election regarding access to the ballots and that this is somehow a reason to suggest that this would be a quote-unquote simple change to make.

Your Honor, the reason there weren't suits about this issue before the 2020 election is people were simply able to vote. I doubt you could find many, if any, people in the State of Wisconsin who thought that it was illegal for a spouse to put their absentee ballot in the mail. This was a concept that became an issue only recently because of the instant lawsuit.

and SCIU, two decisions that, frankly, don't complicate the significant constitutional questions raised in Purcell. Of course, they reached different decisions —determinations. They have completely different facts at

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issue. They were not dealing with the same Purcell question, the same severity of it, that this Court has to grapple with now.

Finally, your Honor, again, I'm surprised, I suppose, Plaintiffs continue to argue that there will be no harm. Again, the affidavits that this court has seen demonstrate that upwards of 80,000 Wisconsinites require assistance of others simply to be active in the community. Plaintiffs themselves, in their submission to the court, cited eight or ten of our affidavits that identified individuals who in just a matter of days came forward to the court expressing their concern that they're going to lose the right to vote.

That is an incredible harm. I think that everyone here on this hearing thinks that the right to vote is quite important and consequential. Plaintiffs have not carried their own burden to identify anything to the contrary. There is nothing to suggest that a stay is going to keep people from voting. It's just this allegation, Your Honor, that these two individuals claim some confusion and that their confusion about what the law is is the harm. That pales in comparison to what, at least according to the record as it stands today, is massive disenfranchisement.

Finally, Plaintiffs are upset apparently

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that they haven't been able to depose the people who signed these affidavits or do any discovery. We would welcome such depositions, because we think it might help Plaintiffs understand the severity of the problem, something that they seemingly insist on rejecting. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Then on to Attorney Kilpatrick.

MR. KILPATRICK: Thank you, Your Honor.

I appreciate you giving me one last attempt to speak on the issue. I would just kind of piggyback on what counsel for the league has said in regard to the statutes that the Plaintiffs say expressly allow agents to assist electors, as alleged by the Plaintiffs. It's the commission's position that there likely be will be confusion with these people.

of statutes that cover folks who need assistance, well, they are out in the cold. Life seems to be saying, too bad, what you have to do is bring a lawsuit separately. What would be easier and better and a more just resolution is a stay of this Court's order through the February 15th election. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Then on to Attorney Devaney.

MR. DEVANEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

Nothing further, except to say that we join in the rebuttal arguments of both the league and Elections Commission.

In listening to the arguments, the Defendants and the Plaintiffs really come from two different perspectives. The Defendants -- certainly, the defendant league speaks of massive voter confusion. That's never been an issue in this case. They submitted some affidavits which talk about that, but there's been no fact-finding on it. There's been no conclusions drawn. The issues in this case were initially legal issues with regard to the nature of the statute and the nature of the administrative guidance that the Elections Commission then had issued.

from an entirely new perspective as to what took place in this case. That, in fact, did not take place. There's been no factual determinations with regard to confusion with regard to the voters. There's been accusations raised after the -- certainly if they were raised during the initial hearing, they've been raised as the central part of the Defendants' argument for a stay in this proceeding based upon the affidavits that were filed.

This Court continues to look at the issue

as a legal issue, not as a fact issue, at this stage of the proceedings. When the Court issued its ruling, it looked to the statutes as to what the statute said, and did the commission — the Elections Commission follow it. I concluded — the Court concluded the Elections

Commission had not, that the guidance issued did not follow the statutes. It was really a legislative action by the Elections Commission with regard to the statute.

The changes were made by the Elections

Commission in how they looked at those statutes. In

reading them, the Elections Commission was really

responding to efforts to, if you will, make absentee

voting easier, to some extent, not to what the law said.

This isn't about whether the proposals for lock boxes is a

good idea or a bad idea. What it's about is, is there

authority to do it. It's plain and simple.

This Court found that not only was there not authority for the Elections Commission to do it, the statutes are unambiguous, they're clear. Nobody can be confused in reading them. Nobody was apparently confused in reading the statutes for a number of years. The Court also found that the commission had acted in proposing — in using the guidance, the commission had actually set forth rules that needed to be adopted properly under Wisconsin law, and they had not done that.

evidence, but it was a submission by the Plaintiffs from action by a leg29 oversight committee when they were going to look at one of the guidances and proposed that it should come in as a proposed rule. That is the point that the Plaintiffs made and that the Court recognized in its initial decision.

There simply is no basis for the guidance issued by the Elections Commission. It was challenged in this lawsuit. In looking at *Purcell*, *Purcell* and the cases under it, this Court is satisfied, from a procedural standpoint clearly relate to federal courts interfering with state election proceedings. *Purcell*, although it was minutes ago argued that *Purcell* dealt with massive voter confusion, that was — I read the case a number of times. I understand the issues in the case, but it never was laid out quite the way as dramatically as Attorney Thompson did.

Remember, in the *Purcell* case, it was about Arizona law that required proof of citizenship to register and then at voting there had to be an ID used to vote. In that case the district court had — the lawsuit was started by the plaintiffs, the district court had essentially denied the lawsuit, the defendants went to the Ninth Circuit and had a stay issued. It was that stay

that was the focus of the *Purcell* decision, and the Supreme Court said they were reversing the Ninth Circuit with regard to the stay for a number of reasons that were really procedural, didn't really go to the merits of the issue, but it was clear that it was going to go back to the state and the state law would prevail.

In the other cases that — some Seventh Circuit cases and other matters that were cited by the Defendants, it's really the same issue. The federal courts had taken some steps to change what the state law was and how the state election laws were implemented, and that action was stopped based upon the concept in *Purcell* that the federal courts could not enjoin what was going on in the states. That's a simplistic analysis. I'm not going to brief each of the cases cited and go through it, but that's essentially how this Court understands it.

Purcell, I'm satisfied, addresses federal court interference with state election procedures. Now, the concept in Purcell is just what the Defendants argue and that is the issue of voter confusion. When you make changes, does that throw off the election to the extent that it becomes unfair to those who want to vote and you're interfering with the right to vote.

That is a concept, but it doesn't mean that just because it's alleged, that it's actually present. It

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hasn't been proved in this case. This Court looked at the statutes and adopted, this Court believes, a straight-forward reading of what the statutes say, didn't embellish it, didn't try and color it, didn't legislate what the statutes mean.

Purcell doesn't stand for the proposition, as I read it, that any change in the status quo all of a sudden results in some disenfranchisement to the voters. It's not present in Purcell. It's not present in the other cases that were cited about Purcell and it's not present in this matter, even with the affidavits that were filed by the Defendants.

This Court enforced an existing statute.

It's the commission that entered these guidances that changed the law. This Court simply ruled that the law should be followed. There's plenty of time, in this Court's view, for the election clerks to be able to issue the necessary guidelines and to conduct their elections following these laws that the Court talked about and the Court enforced.

I'm satisfied, in looking at the basis for a temporary injunction, the burden has not been met. This Court is satisfied that there's not a great likelihood of success on the Defendant's behalf as to the merits and the substance of the Court's decision. The Court is satisfied

that in following the statutes, the public is not harmed.

Certainly in following the statutes, the public is benefited by elected public officials who adopt laws, having those laws followed, as opposed to administrative appointees making changes to those laws and then having those laws, if you will, foisted upon the public without any type of legislative review by the individuals and entities who should be making those policy changes.

That's not what Wisconsin law provides for. That's why there's a method to adopt rules through Chapter 227 of the Wisconsin statutes, and that wasn't done in this case. This Court is satisfied that there's not irreparable harm for the ruling to continue. There's not a chance of success, and the public interest is really benefited by the statutes being administered, according to what they say as opposed to what other people think they say and as opposed to what individuals try to and do to change the process without going through the proper legislative process.

The country, the United States, has a system of due process in law that requires that laws' policy changes be legislative, not that policy changes are permitted by the appointed individuals trying to administer those laws. What is somewhat of an affront to

society generally is that the Elections Commission took a stance that didn't really modify the statute, they changed it. They dramatically changed what the wording of the statute is. That shouldn't happen through an administrative body without the proper process. This Court's ruling went to that. Does following that process harm individuals generally in the public? This Court is satisfied it does not.

So I'm satisfied that the basis for a temporary injunction pending the election, the February 17th election, has not been set forth by the parties. Attorney Kilpatrick said it well, that he looked at the proposed motion as going toward the February 15th primary election and not going toward the general election thereafter in April. So I looked at it from that standpoint, too, but are we at that point when the Court should issue a stay relative to the Court's decision based on the February 15th primary.

In a way, it's an easier call for the Court. If I wanted to make that call, I could say, sure, let's do it and stay it. But that's not following the law. I'm satisfied the law is clear. The communities, the public, deserve to have the election in February guided and administered according to the statutes adopted by their elected representatives, not called out by the

individuals who were on the Elections Commission. So I deny it as to that.

What I am concerned about is that Attorney Kilpatrick I think said that the deadline for the election clerks to send out their absentee ballot materials was January $24^{\hbox{th}}$.

Attorney Kilpatrick?

MR. KILPATRICK: Yes, Your Honor, the deadline for the county clerks to send out the ballots to the municipal clerks. And then there's a different deadline for the municipal clerks to send out the ballots to the voters.

THE COURT: So the key is really the January $24^{\mbox{th}}$ date, or is it the $25^{\mbox{th}}$?

MR. KILPATRICK: The 25th, I believe.

THE COURT: In my order, when I issued the order initially, I had said that no later than

January 27th the Elections Commission should withdraw their memo and issue its statements to the court that the memos were declared invalid by the court.

That would come late, and I'm going to change that. I'm going to order that that be submitted by January 24, 2022. And that's a Monday. That's this coming Monday, but there's certainly been sufficient publicity to be sure that that's done accordingly.

From the publicity that the cases had, I'm satisfied that anybody who has an interest in elections is aware of what the Court ruled and what the process is. So that will be -- I'll make that modification to my order that was signed by the Court on Wednesday.

MR. KILPATRICK: Your Honor, if I may, then for the commission, because of this change, I believe there is another need for me to ask for a stay of that change because, pending appeal, the commission has filed an appeal, but the change that the commission must act no later than Monday, it does not give sufficient time for the commission to file a stay motion with the Court of Appeals before having to comply with your deadline.

So I'd ask that the Court reconsider changing at least the deadline by which the commission must withdraw its memoranda.

THE COURT: Any other responses?

MR. BERG: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I am going to deny that request. I'm satisfied there's sufficient time for the commission to act. And if they're filing an appeal, there's still plenty of time to file it today and on Monday. So I deny that request.

I'll ask Attorney Berg to draft the necessary order and submit it to the court. I ask that

1	you submit it either later today or Monday morning.
2	MR. BERG: I will submit it as soon as
3	possible, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
5	Anything else from the Attorney Thompson?
6	MR. THOMPSON: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
7	THE COURT: Anything else from Attorney
8	Kilpatrick?
9	MR. KILPATRICK: No, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Anything else from Attorney
11	Devaney?
12	MR. DEVANEY: No, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Anything else from Attorney
14	Berg?
15	MR. BERG: No, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
17	MR. KILPATRICK: Your Honor, I do have one
18	more.
19	THE COURT: Sure, go ahead.
20	MR. KILPATRICK: In my request, what I
21	didn't factor in is that what we have here is a public
22	body that needs to get together and meet, and to take
23	action in order to fulfill the request or the directive of
24	of this court. And as I had said before, there was
25	possibly a meeting that was going to take place on the
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28th to address the JCRAR's directive to promulgate rules. That was, I believe, the last scheduled meeting of the commission.

And with the Court's change in the 27th deadline to the 24th, I simply cannot guarantee that the commission would be able to get together and to meet and to take any action. That would require — it would be required to follow this court's order, given that it is late in the afternoon on a Friday, and we've got a commission, a body of six separate commissioners. I feel that that may be very difficult to do, so that's another factor that I apologize for not raising sooner.

THE COURT: Well, one of the Court's concerns is that with the initial deadline that the court had said to the $27^{\rm th}$, even though the knowledge of the decision is known, that would permit the Defendants to argue that the commission could send out documents under the old directive without — and then claim, well, we didn't have to do it until the $27^{\rm th}$, which is after our mailing.

So I know that wasn't anybody's intent, but in looking at that, I'm concerned with that; thus I looked at those dates and thought that -- and still concluded it's better to have the date there for the commission to act by the 24th in order to provide the necessary

notice. Through e-mail, it's certainly it's easy to do.

Otherwise with the publicity the case has, I'm satisfied that the commission knows about the case.

I note in looking at the court docket that the commission, at least in the Circuit Court of Waukesha, hasn't filed an appeal. The league parties filed an appeal.

MR. KILPATRICK: We did file yesterday.

Looking at my computer screen, it may have just come
through e-mail notification. The commission did file the
notice of appeal yesterday. It may have just come through
now.

THE COURT: It wasn't filed with the Circuit Court in Waukesha. It was filed with the Court of Appeals.

MR. KILPATRICK: No, no, I'm sorry. The notice of appeal was filed in this court, Your Honor, your court, along with the docketing statement. I believe it just came through e-mail notification. The other parties will be able to confirm if they have theirs.

THE COURT: I was just looking at our court records. But at this point I'll deny your request. So ordered.

MR. KILPATRICK: Okay.

THE COURT: That should end our hearing

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1	then. Thank you all. Everybody have a good day, good
2	weekend.
3	MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
4	(Whereupon, proceedings were concluded.)
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4	STATE OF WISCONSIN)) SS.
5	COUNTY OF WAUKESHA)
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9	I, ROSE MARIE RODERICK, certify that I am
10	the official court reporter assigned to report the
11	proceedings herein for the Circuit Court; that the
12	foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 40 inclusive, have
13	been carefully compared by me with my stenographic notes;
14	that the same is a true and correct transcript of all such
15	proceedings taken on the 21 st day of January, 2022.
16	Dated this 24 th day of January, 2022.
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20	ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED BY:
21	Rose Marie Roderick
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23	ROSE MARIE RODERICK Official Court Reporter
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